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Matthew Schneider-Mayerson’s Peak Oil (2015) is a compelling and nuanced account of
the peak oil movement in the era of climate crisis. Organized online between 2004 and 2011, the
peak oil movement, Schneider-Mayerson argues, can also be thought of as a phenomenon or
community of individuals sharing information, but mostly acting alone. In this timely, engaging,
well-written, and accessible book, Schneider-Mayerson argues that a libertarian shift in culture
within the context of environmental crisis explains the individualistic behavior of peakists even
as they, in line with their overwhelmingly liberal political ideologies, recognize the need for
collective action. Peak Oil pushes readers to recognize the urgent need for political action on
climate change while simultaneously providing a thoughtful and sympathetic explanation for
why so many people respond to environmental crisis in individualistic ways. Readers alarmed by
climate crisis will connect with peakist impulses toward self-sufficiency while gaining a deeper
understanding of the political and cultural milieu that informs political inaction on climate
change.
Peak Oil offers an in-depth portrait of peakists––who they are, how they compare to the
general population, how they became “peak aware,” and what they do with their knowledge. Yet,
it also does much more. Through detailed analysis of the history of beliefs about abundance and
scarcity, oil production and prices, the libertarian shift, the development of the internet, and
American apocalyptic thought, it uses a story about peakists to shed light on broad trends at the
intersection of energy, technology, cultural imaginations, masculinity, and political economy.
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For this reason, it is a useful text for readers in these diverse fields and for those interested in
how historical and contemporary trends inform collective capacity for imagining a future within
and beyond climate crisis.
The book begins with a detailed account of peakists that draws on rich data from open
ended survey questions and interviews. Peakists’ individual beliefs, actions, and experiences
trying to share their views with the people around them is situated within the broader history of
oil in America. In succinct chapter sections that would be very useful for teaching, SchneiderMayerson reminds the reader of oil’s unique qualities as an energy source while linking oil to
growth paradigms and literature on American optimism. He traces perspectives on growth from
Malthus through the rise of 1960s environmentalism in the United States. The links between
hegemonic growthmanship (see 60-61) and the power of conservative and libertarian ideologies
ascendant since WWII help account for individualism in ways that previous authors have glossed
over (82).
Vitally, Schneider-Mayerson also demonstrates the libertarian foundations of the internet,
which, when combined with the broader political swing toward libertarianism, has had
tremendous individualizing effects on the internet based movement he writes about. Peakists’
virtual movement, or community space, exacerbates political economic pushes toward
individualism because peakists significantly underestimate their numbers. This insight, relevant
for other twenty-first century social movements, points to how important collective face to face
mobilization is for giving movement participants an accurate sense of their combined power.
Shifting to engaging analyses of popular peakist literature and cultural representations of
apocalyptic futures, Peak Oil then considers how disaster and lack of trust in government shape
imaginations of a post-peak world. Schneider-Mayerson finds that peakists, in the words of one
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member of the website Peak Oil News, “find it easier to believe in the complete disintegration of
America and its culture than in the possibility of an American society which has adapted to
changed circumstances and innovated new solutions” (127). His argument illustrates how
unsurprising this is “[g]iven the preponderance of apocalyptic narratives in American culture and
the absence of alternate visions of environmental and social change” (127). Again, this insight is
extremely relevant beyond the peakist community. Developing imaginations capable of
envisioning a world beyond oil and beyond capitalism is the first step to taking justice-oriented
action on climate change. Peakists’ imaginations mirror the individualizing political and virtual
context in which peakists have become a community, even though a majority see themselves as
liberal and very liberal, with substantial numbers identifying as anarchists, socialists, and
progressives––all political ideologies that the reader might assume would enable more
communal imaginations of the future. As Schneider-Mayerson states, “[c]laims that ecoapocalyptic attitudes lead to political passivity may be true, but we might also view the peak oil
movement as the sublimation of a political vision into a prophecy or a new configuration of
radical political beliefs that reflects our privatized, neoliberal age” (128).
The final analytic chapter of the book unpacks the finding—generated by SchneiderMayerson’s surveys––that a majority of peakists are white men. This chapter is a culmination of
the author’s skill in weaving historical and current trends and media together to enhance
understanding of the crossroads of American environmental action today. Schneider-Mayerson
chronicles the influence of earlier dystopian masculinities, rendered in films like Mad Max, and
twenty-first century changes in men’s labor market participation to show why so many peakist
imaginations aspire to “hard” and frontier masculinities. The peak oil movement provides men a
“means of reinscribing ‘traditional’ (read 1950s) gender roles and revitalizing [a] white
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masculinity” (130) threatened by the huge cuts to manufacturing jobs in the mid 2000s,
mechanization of existing manufacturing jobs, and the increasing racial diversity of the United
States. Many male peakist imaginations then, were informed by a desire for what one peakist
described as “more meaningful, though likely physically harder, work that will help support
families and communities” (139). To shed light on this phenomenon, Schneider-Mayerson again
draws the reader’s attention to the dearth of imaginations––in this case, of alternate
masculinities. Rather than imagining a different future, many peakists looked to forms of
retrosexuality––traditional gender roles where tough men survive and physically weak men, even
if brilliant (think the tech wizards of our era), do not. In sum, this chapter offers a justice oriented
and appropriately critical analysis of how some peakist views on race, gender, and economy
align with socially conservative individualism. This not only illustrates the power of
conservative social beliefs, even among people who identify as liberals, but also explains the
demographics of the peakist community.
I have no real critique of this book. For the sake of offering ideas for how it might deepen
reader’s satisfaction, I highlight two points. For readers interested in methodologies, Peak Oil’s
short explanation of methods in the introduction will leave questions. While more details on how
the surveys and interviews fit together are described in the conclusion, little information is
provided up front. The author employs insightful excerpts from open-ended survey questions
throughout the book, yet does not provide these questions in the appendix. Secondly, despite the
impressive survey reach––from only two website links in January 2011, Schneider-Mayerson
received 1128 surveys from respondents who lived in every region of the world––the analysis is
U.S. centric. The reasons for this are obvious––the scope of the book and the important role the
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U.S. plays in the history and politics of oil––yet it would be exciting to explore place based
variation in the data to learn about global diversities in peakist beliefs and actions.
To conclude, Peak Oil is an impressive example of using analysis of a little-known
movement to shed light on broader social trends in the United States that inform imaginaries of
the future in response to climate change. It contributes understanding of how a group of people
manage the “urgent yet bearable shadow” (Amsler quoted on 157) of peak-oil and climate crisis
through individualized action. With appropriate push for more collective action, the book
nonetheless facilitates empathy for peakists and other people taking climate science seriously,
people who are often marginalized when trying to share the troubling reality of climate crisis
with others. While their actions are individual, the examples they set––on how to reduce and
optimize energy use and value skills necessary for localized economies––are important. They
can have a “tangible effect on the environmental crisis of the will” and environmental
communication while destabilizing the socially organized denial that prevents climate action
(158).
This short book explores big themes that should be on the minds of more people today.
By clarifying how politics and cultural currents shape responses to environmental crisis, it makes
space for more informed and creative conversation about, and collaborative imagining of, a just
future. In a context of restricted imagination, peakists’ efforts to imagine and act on their
imaginations is a refreshing first step to a different future. As Schneider-Mayerson writes:
Life after oil––whether the transition is pushed by climate change, energy depletion, or
(likely) both––will, thus, require not only an economic, technological, and infrastructural
but also a social and cultural transformation that is beyond most of our imaginations. If
some peakists’ visions were biased by anxieties, fears, and hopes that were surprisingly
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common in the early twenty-first-century United States, they might be pardoned for the
intimidating scale of their endeavor: imagining and cultivating a post-carbon world that
does not merely replicate the injustices of the past. (149)
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